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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellant has at every opportunity demanded his unalienable rights at all times and not waived his rights at any time
including his right to time.

He has denied the lower courts

jurisdiction in this matter because it was a matter of rights. His
demand for proof of the lower court's jurisdiction has been ignored
along with his rights as a Free Citizen. The arresting officer has
lied on the citations, on the witness stand and even changed his
testimony from the Precinct Court to the Circuit Court.

When he

was questioned about the facts of the case, he purposely avoided
the facts that would prove his false-swearing.

Judge Alfred C.

VanWagenen has, at every opportunity, tried to harm the Appellant's
case, cause him anguish, deny him his common unalienable rights and
deny him due process of law in the court.
When two persons disagree with the events, the facts should
be

reviewed

and

when

there

is

found

contradictions

and

discrepancies in the testimony and the records of the police
officers, there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt.
It should be noted that the Appellant is appearing in Propria
Persona, or in proper person, not Pro Se.

The Appellant has not

appeared in any of the lower courts as an attorney.

The Appellant

is not an attorney and has never acted a one, he has merely
appeared as a proper person in his own defense.

He, therefore,

cannot be held to the same standards as an attorney or officer of
the court (See Bouvier's Law Dictionary).
With

these

"facts" in mind,
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the Appellant

submits

the

jurisdiction of this case to the Utah Court of Appeals, praying for
justice, due process and protection of his rights.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

The issue of jurisdiction was never addressed by the

prosecution or the court, even when the Appellant raised the
question. The Appellant demands all of his rights and waives none.
2.

Utah Code 46-6-46, under which the Appellant was charged,

is in contradiction to UC 46-6-47 and 48.

UC 46-6-46 is unclear

and unconstitutional.
3.

Motion for right "Sua Sponte" were denied.

4.

Demand for Counsel of Choice was denied.

5. Art. Ill, Sec. 2 of the U. S. Constitution states that the
Supreme Court of the United States shall have original jurisdiction
of all cases in which the state shall be a party.
6.

If this case is a criminal matter and the state is

bringing the charge against a Free Citizen, then the matter belongs
in a Common Law Court with a 12 man jury of his peers.

The Court

never denied the Appellant's Free Citizen status.
7.

Could it be a crime when there was no loss, damage,

injury, harm or trespass against another's rights?

There was no

intent and no complaint signed by the injured party, because there
was no injured party.
8.

There was no reliable witness.

Magna Carta Article #38

and #45.
9. Florida v. Ana Aquilera and consolidated cases consisting
of an investigation by the County Court of 80 speeding cases,
expenditure

of

$75,000,

testimony

from

numerous

qualified

witnesses, resulting in 33 exhibits and in excess of 2,000 pages
of transcript evidence proving that RADAR devices cannot lawfully
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present

"evidence"

against

citizens

because

of

manifest

and

multiple errors, deficiencies, lack of scientific certainty and
lack of reliability in a court; was thrown out by the Clearfield
Circuit Court.
10.

The Appellant was denied due process when he requested

discovery of RADAR manual and specifications and was denied by the
Judge even though it was demanded by motion at least three times.
11.

The Appellant requests the Court of Appeals to review the

motions presented to the court to see if there is any validity or
deserve consideration on appeal.
12.

The Appellant was denied the right to voir dire the

prospective jurors.

The Judge often changed the questions to suit

himself when the Appellant presented a question.
13.

The Appellant was denied his right to challenge for cause

and have prospective jurors dismissed who had admitted to being
prejudiced against him. None were dismissed even though one argued
against the Appellant for several minutes.
14.
consisted

The Appellant's
of

jury instructions were denied.

Constitutional

provisions

plus

State

and

Some

Federal

Supreme Court case law.
15.

When the Appellant demanded a jury trial, the Judge

denied it at first then relented providing the Appellant put up
$300 bail or a $600 property bond.

The Appellant

decision and finally the Judge relented to no bond.
this

bail

(10

times

the

normal

fine)

seems

argued the

The threat of

to

exceed

the

protections set forth in the 8th Amendment in the Bill of Rights.
This was probably the only point won by the Appellant
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in the

Clearfield Court.
16. The evidence documented at the scene was in conflict with
the testimony of the officers. The officer's story in the Precinct
Court was totally different than in the Circuit Court.
17.

From the first motion hearing, the attitude of the Judge

was one of contempt and scorn for the Appellant.
his oral arguments were allowed.

Almost none of

The Judge was the adversary and

carried the prosecution over 90 percent of the time during this
entire case.
18. BAKER'S Affidavit of Impecuniosity was denied even though
all the evidence entered into the court showed that he was. There
was no evidence supporting the court's decision.
19. Transcripts of the trial was denied BAKER even though the
Utah Constitution Art. I, Sec. 12, states:

"In no instance shall

any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed."
20.

Even though the Appellant had submitted a "Notice of

Appeal" and a "Stay of Execution Pending Appeal" to the Court, the
Judge placed BAKER under arrest at the Sentencing Hearing and BAKER
was compelled to pay the $30 fine or go to prison.
21.

A sentence of 20 days in prison or $40 fine for

travelling 71 mph in a 55 mph zone is a little much when the
Appellant had only one other ticket in the last three years. Could
it be said that he wanted to catch BAKER without the cash on him?
22.

If evidence is rejected by the court or not allowed to

be presented in court, can that evidence be used in the appeal?
23.

The seizure of the Appellant was a violation of his

Fourth Amendment rights as held in Brown v. Texas, etc.
24.

The Appellant was not allowed to tell the jury that they

had the right to determine the law and the fact.
The officer's notes, consisting of several pages supposedly
taken at the scene of the crime, was denied the Appellant for his
use at the trial.
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AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOUSITY

I, L.D. BAKER, do solemnly affirm that owing to my
poverty, I am unable to bear the expenses of portecting
myself in these legal proceedings which are about to commence, and that"! verily believe I am justly entitled to the
relief sought by such action.

Subscribed and sworn before me on this /£//# day of
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the 16th of February, 1987, appellant BAKER was traveling
north on 1-15 through the Centerville area.

BAKER was stopped and

charged with doing 71 mph in an area posted at 55 mph.
The case was tried in the Davis County Precinct Court with
Judge John D. Stewart presiding, and BAKER was found guilty.
case was appealed to the Clearfield Circuit Court.

The

(Meanwhile,

about ten days after the Precinct Court Trial, the same officer
followed BAKER for five miles and arrested him again for doing 65
mph in a 55 mph posted area on U. S. 89. As the officer approached
BAKER, he said that he was going to teach him a lesson.)
case was

tried

in the Clearfield

Court with

The 71/65

Judge Alfred

VanWagener presiding with a four person jury.

C.

BAKER was found

guilty.
BAKER, who has insufficient funds to sustain himself, could
not pay for the transcripts

for his appeal.

He has filed an

Affidavit of Impecuniosity and demanded the transcripts of the
case.

The Court of Appeals accepted the Affidavit, but mistakenly

ordered the City of Clearfield to pay for the Transcripts.

Judge

VanWagener demonstrated his bias and prejudice against BAKER in his
letter informing the Court of Appeals that the city of Clearfield
was

not

involved.

impecunious,

in

his

The

Judge

opinion,

insisted

and

was

that

only

a

BAKER

was

trouble

Constitutionalist trying to cost the government money.

not

making

The Court

of Appeals vacated their ruling of impecuniosity and remanded the
decision back to good old Judge VanWagener.

Of course, the Judge

found

that

BAKER

was

not

impecunious, without

any

evidence

presented to substantiate that ruling. All the information entered
into evidence represented that BAKER was impecunious.
The Appellant, Mr. BAKERf is presenting this brief without the
benefit of the transcripts, even though they are of substantial
importance in this case. BAKER is still in no position to pay for
the transcripts and hereby certifies that he is still impecunious.
FACT
Article I, Section 12, The Utah State Constitution states.
"In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed."
The transcripts cannot be denied BAKER in his quest to prove his
innocence, if the Utah Constitution is still valid.
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Is it?

THE SCENE OF THE CRIME
BAKER was traveling in the inside lane (left) of the three
northbound lanes of 1-15 on the 16th of February, 1987, through
Centervillef Utah.

It was after 10 p.m. and on a very dark night.

BAKER had followed in that left lane since Bountiful, about three
miles back.

When there was an opportunity for the car ahead to

move into the middle lane, BAKER flashed his lights and the vehicle
moved over.

BAKER set his cruise control on 62 mph.

Several years

ago the Colonel of the Highway Patrol stated on radio that no one
would be bothered unless they exceeded 62 mph.

BAKER had used that

as a guide and had traveled alongside many Utah Highway Patrol
(UHP) vehicles without any challenges for several years.
Unknown to BAKER, the group of cars was a log-jam of twenty
to twenty-five vehicles caused by a UHP vehicle setting the pace
at about 55 or 56 mph.
to 50 feet apart.

The middle lane was solid with cars 40 feet

The outside lane was also quite busy.

The left

lane, in which BAKER was traveling, had one vehicle about 800 feet
ahead of him and traveling at about the same speed.

It should be

pointed out here that when the cars are slowed down from their
normal

speed, they

According

tend

to bunch

to anyone with

traffic

up

and

follow

engineering

too

closely.

experience, this

condition could result in multiple car accidents if anyone makes
a mistake.

The car following may be able to stop or avoid the car

in trouble, but the second or third cannot avoid them, therefore,
a serious accident results.

3

The

police

officer

admits

conditions on his citation.

to

"moderate

heavy"

traffic

This was the only place on

1-15

between Provo and Farmington where BAKER had encountered dense
traffic that evening.

The officer checked that it was "dry,"

"dark," "none" passengers and that the conditions of the violator
was "calm."

The officer's comments were that the violator was "250

(feet?) distance" or "about 1/8 mile."

All of those comments are

stipulated to except that 1/8 mile is 660 feet not 250 feet.

He

claimed in court that he could judge the speed of a vehicle within
1 mph at 300 feet away without any difficulty.

Each 1 mph would

be 1.5 feet every second; that is good estimating.

If he cannot

estimate the distance of a vehicle closer than between 250 feet and
1/8 mile (660 feet) and believes they are approximately the same,
there has to be a problem.
One of the lies told by the officer on the second Citation
(issued to BAKER shortly after the Precinct Trial on this case) was
that:

"I problem the last time I cited this man."

This indicates

that he claimed on the second Citation that BAKER had caused him
trouble when he was stopped for this first Citation.

There appears

to be no indication of any problem on this Citation, nor was there
anything

said

at the Precinct Trial.

Such a statement

on a

Citation appears to be in violation of Utah Code, Sections 76-8201 Official Misconduct; 76-8-502 False or inconsistent material
statements; 76-8-503 False or inconsistent statements; 76-8-504
Written false statements; 76-8-505 Perjury or false swearing-proof
of

falsity

of

statements.

statements on the Citations.

The

witness

is

his

own

written

The officer also violated 76-8-511
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Falsification or alteration of government record. His checking the
"moderate" traffic conditions on the second citation when there was
not another vehicle within

1/2 mile was another outright lie.

These facts can be verified by the citations and by UDOT traffic
engineer.
The above may not pertain to this case, but it does refer to
this case and it proves the officer will lie to prove a person
guilty, just like he did when he accused BAKER of traveling 71 mph
in this instant case.
Continuing with the facts at the scene of the crime as BAKER
saw them.

BAKER had traveled a mile or so at 62 mph in the left

lane, gaining on the vehicles in the middle lane at about 5 or 6
mph, or about seven feet per second.
gain 60 or
length.

It took about ten seconds to

70 feet, the distance between vehicles plus their

In the rear view mirror BAKER noticed a vehicle in his

lane about 500 feet behind him because of the bright lights of the
car.

BAKER noticed that the car was traveling very fast, passing

the cars in the middle lane at the rate of one every three seconds
or so.

The car had to be traveling about 40 mph faster than the

cars in the middle lane, or about 100 mph.
into the middle lane to let him pass.

BAKER gradually merged

The vehicle from behind did

not come within 200 feet of BAKER before BAKER had merged into the
middle lane.
The speeding vehicle pulled up alongside BAKER and flashed the
red and blue lights, signaling BAKER to move over to the outside
shoulder and stop.

That is precisely what BAKER did.

Sgt. Owen

Busch, Badge #63 was the arresting officer and Patrolman Lloyd
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Michaud, Badge #384 was with him.
Sgt. Busch was the only officer to come to the Precinct trial.
He testified that he had shot BAKER1 s car with RADAR, then clocked
him to verify the speed.
This testimony bothers BAKER, because BAKER knew that from 500
to 600 feet back the police car had been going close to 100 mph and
there was no way for the police to clock a car without going the
exact same speed.

The testimony that Busch had shot BAKER'S car

with RADAR had to be answered in the Trial de Novo.

BAKER scoured

the area for RADAR experts and found several, but they need the
specifications and manual for the specific RADAR

gun used.

BAKER

wrote several letters to the Circuit Court demanding discovery of
the

information.

denied.

He

also

BAKER'S
had

demand

demanded

for

the

discovery

transcripts

was
of

blatantly
the

Motion

Hearing, since he could not remember clearly all that had taken
place.

They were denied BAKER also.

One week before the trial, it became clear from the Judge's
letter that BAKER was not going to get the specifications on the
RADAR.

BAKER talked to P.O.S.T. who teaches the police officers.

Mr. Earl Morris, who teaches clocking of vehicles and Lt. Ben
Lemmon of the U. of U. Police, who teaches RADAR at P.O.S.T. were
subpoenaed on Monday morning and the trial was the next Friday.
Neither man showed up in court.

The Salt Lake City Sheriff was

apparently unsuccessful at delivering the subpoenas, even though
both men were in and out of their offices all week long.
BAKER'S purpose for inviting these men was to bring out the
facts and the truth.

Morris laughed when he was told about Busch* s
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testimony.

Patrolman Michaud was also subpoenaed, and he showed

up.
What bothered BAKER the whole time between the trial was: How
did Busch shoot the RADAR 250 or 300 feet down the left traffic
lane and hit the smallest car on the road, yet miss the eight or
ten cars to the side in the middle lane within six feet of the line
of sight and miss the oncoming traffic and trucks in the southbound
lanes just 40 feet to the left of BAKER, when the RADAR usually
has a beam about 15 degrees wide?
Between the court denying BAKER the RADAR specifications, the
S.L.C. Sheriff not delivering the subpoenas and the fact that Busch
changed his entire testimony in the Circuit Court, which was then
supported by Michaud, BAKER had his hands full.

He did not need

the harassment by the Judge.
Now, here is the testimony of Busch in the new trial.

Busch

was in the right lane (causing the log-jam of cars) when he noticed
BAKER'S car in the left lane going faster than the cars in the
middle lane. Both Busch and Michaud testified that the traffic was
heavy, or at least "moderate heavy."
Everyone who has driven on 1-15

knows that when cars are

bunched up in a log-jam at 55 mph, the middle lane is always
solidly packed and usually the left lane is also.

Every observer

of log-jam must admit that the vehicles travel within 40 or 50 feet
of each other and many times closer than that.
Busch testified that he was going 55 mph when he moved to the
middle lane where he picked up speed to match BAKER'S speed.

Then

he shot his RADAR on the ground in front of him to verify his
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speed.

Busch and Michaud testified that the BAKER'S vehicle was

at least 250 to 300 feet in front of them in the left lane while
they were clocking him from the middle lane.

(Remember that Busch

thought that BAKER was also about 1/8 mile away, which is 660
feet.)
Sixty mph is equal to 88 feet per second; therefore, one mph
equals 1.47 feet per second, say 1.5 feet per second.

If BAKER was

traveling at 71 mph, he must have been doing 16 mph (or 24 feet per
second) faster than all of the other vehicles on the road.
is Busch's testimony.
BAKER'S at 71 mph.

That

Busch claimed that he adjusted his speed to

Busch would not say how long it took his car

to catch up to 71 mph speed, but he did testify that he did and
could easily adjust his speed to BAKER'S and clock him within one
and one-half to two seconds.

Busch would have to be busy to see

a

in

car,

say

speedometer,

300

feet

away

shot

his RADAR

another

the

same

speed

as

check

on the ground, confirm

reading with his own speedometer
exactly

lane,

BAKER

his

own

the RADAR

and verify again that he is
in

"moderate

heavy"

traffic

conditions on a very dark night when all he could possibly see
would be BAKER'S tail lights.
seconds?

All in one and one-half to two

You be the judge.

When Busch was traveling in the middle lane (which was solid
with cars bunched up close together), it must have taken three or
four seconds to pick up speed from 55 mph to 71 mph, let us say
three seconds.

Remember, 16 mph is 24 feet per second.

The first

second he must have gained about 8 feet on the car in front of him,
the second second he must have gained about 16 feet and the third
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second he must have gained about 20 feet; for a total of 44 feet.
If he took two seconds to clock BAKER, that is another 48 feet for
a total of 92 feet he had gained on the car in front of him.

Then

he shot his RADAR on the ground, which he said took only about 50
feet to miss the car in front; for a grand total of 142 feet.
happened to all of the cars in the middle lane?
when Busch decided to pursue BAKER?
three cars ahead of him in his lane?
they clocked BAKER.

What

Did they disappear

Why did Busch not run into
Both officers agree as to how

You be the judge?

When Busch is traveling the middle lane behind a car 50 feet
in front of him, his head is about two feet inside his car.

If he

follows directly behind the car in front, the left side of the car
in front tends to block his vision of the lane on his left at a
ratio of 2 feet to 50 feet or 1:25.

If BAKER'S car is 300 feet

ahead in the left lane, Busch could only see an object 12 feet left
of the car in front of him 300 feet away.
equals 12.

Divide 25 into 300

In plain words, Busch could not even see BAKER'S car.

Suppose that Busch moved his car out of line where he could
see BAKER clearly.

This would conflict with BAKER'S testimony, in

that all of the cars in the middle lane, at least eight in a row,
were all in line as shown by their headlights in his rear view
mirror.

Eight cars spaced at 60 feet would be 480 feet.

The

speeding car was first noticed when it was at least that far back.
Anyway, if Busch moved his car left two feet, he could have
clearly seen the tail lights of BAKER'S car.

Michaud, in the

passenger's side, also testifies that he verified the clock from
his position, which was at least three feet to the right of Busch.
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The ratio of 3 feet in 50 feet (if they ever got within 50 feet of
the car ahead of them) is 1:16.6.

Michaud could not see an object

at 300 feet away unless it was more than 18 feet left of the car
ahead.

Again, you be the judge.

It was a very dark night.

There

was a log-jam of cars all doing 55 mph, moderate heavy traffic and
the middle lane was, as always, the most heavily packed.

Does the

Court of Appeals surmise that maybe Superman could have clocked
BAKER

under

these

conditions

and within

the one and

one-half

seconds.
BAKER recognizes that a person can be trained to estimate the
speed of vehicles that can be clearly seen when viewed from a point
that is off-to-the-side, where the speed of the vehicle can be
compared to stationary objects and the ground nearby.

But any man

who says that he can estimate the speed of a car in less than two
seconds within one mph or even 5 mph from a point 300 feet behind
the car in another lane traveling directly away from him on a very
dark night when only the tail lights can be seen is a superman of
a DAMNED LIAR.

You be the judge.

If the Court of Appeals could get their hands on the tapes,
they may be able to recognize the methods Busch used to avoid
answering the questions that would put these facts before the
court.

In the Precinct Court on the second Citation, BAKER was

determined to get the answers to his questions from Busch in cross
examination.

BAKER was found in Contempt of Court for demanding

that he get an answer to his questions.

Busch avoided all the

questions that were significant to the defense.
"That is the way it is.

Why don't you give up. M
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BAKER was told,

What makes it even more cozy is that there was no doubt in
BAKER'S mind or in the minds of the other persons who attended the
Circuit Court trial that both the Judge and the Prosecutor were
aware of the Officer's avoidance of the questions, that there were
questions about his veracity and that the truth was purposely
denied the jury by one method or another.

How much training as a

trial lawyer or Judge does it take to recognize that?

The Judge's

letter of December 29, 1987 is proof of his disgust and prejudice
toward BAKER,

BAKER had read the Organic Law and many court cases

and decided that he had rights and immunities and did not have to
put up with liars and bullies who find protection and a steady
salary in law enforcement.

BAKER is not anti-police or anti-

courts, he just wants them to tell the truth and obey the law
themselves.

No citizen should have to put up with anything less.

It should be pointed out that not one of BAKER'S motions on
any point was answered or responded to by the prosecution.

Of

course, maybe the prosecutor does not have to answer if he has a
"friend in the court."

At the end of the motion hearing, BAKER

walked to the prosecutor and congratulated him on a job "well done"
saying, "Bill, you have won on every point without opening your
mouth.

How do you do that?"

Bill's answer was silence, but what

can a man say when he is that good.

Retraction:

Bill did say that

he did not know BAKER and had no reason to believe that BAKER would
not show up for the jury trial when the Judge tried to slap a $300
bail or @600 property bond on BAKER.
not recall him opening his mouth.

Other than that, BAKER does

JURISDICTION
The Constitution of the United States, Article III, Section
2 states:
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority;...to controversies between two or more
States;...and between a State, or Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
M
In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and consuls and those in which a State shall be a
party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction."
(Underlining mine)
This case is between a State and a Citizen, it would appear
to the Appellant that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction.
The case of City of Salina v. Wisden, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, appealed
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah; fails as justification
when used as a Jurisdictional argument in this situation and with
this defendant for several reasons.
The case states "In order for our scheme of ordered liberties
to succeed, we must all obey valid laws, even those with which we
do not agree;" I take it that "valid" means laws pertaining to me.
It is a valid law that "all persons register at the nearest post
office" for some people aliens. "All persons must register for the
draft" is a valid law.

But do they pertain to me?

Valid statutes are those that are not repugnant to the Law;
meaning the Organic Law as found in Volume I of the U. S. Code.
Those statutes that do not have roots in the Organic Law are null
and void per the U. S. Supreme Court.
unalienable rights or immunities.
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No statutes may violate my

The state, county and municipalities may, "under its police
power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare:
but it may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict
it."

(THOMPSON v. Smith) 154 S.E. 579, 583.

In the higher courts

opinion, it is "Search and Seizure" under the Fourth Amendment when
any police officer stops a "Citizen" and there is no substance to
his "Charge."

No loss, victim, intent or crime.

"But whenever the operation and effect of any general
regulation is to extinguish or destroy that by which the law
of the land is the property of any person, so far as it has
that effect: it is considered as being deprivation of property
within the meaning of this Constitutional guarantee if it
deprives an owner of one of its essential attributes, destroys
its value, restricts or interrupts its common, necessary or
profitable use, hampers the owner in the application of it to
the purposes of trade, or imposes conditions upon the right
to hold, or use it and thereby seriously impairs its value."
(16 AM JUR. 2d, Const. Law Section 369).
If there is damage, loss, trespass of rights, victim and
intent, there may have been a crime committed which calls for an
investigation, etc.

If there is no crime (i.e., intent, damage and

victim being necessary to constitute a crime), there may be a civil
matter and the victim or damaged person must make a complaint.
In the Salina case there is a statement, "The right to travel
granted by the state and federal constitutions does not include the
ability to ignore laws governing the use of public roadways."
Where

in

any

organic

law

(including

both

state

and

federal

constitutions) is the "right to travel" granted to "Citizens"?

The

Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation, Ordinance
of

1787:

The Northwest

Constitution

Territorial

Government

of

the U. S.

(which constitute the Organic Law of the land and

found in Volume I of the U. S. Code in front of Title I) did not
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grant us the "right to travel."

We always had that right.

The

states granted that right to Corporations and regulated industries
that act or use the roads and other public facilities as a matter
of "privilege" and use the public roads and other public facilities
for profit or gain in a mercantile pursuit, supposedly for the
public good.
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and
to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of
life and business is a common right which he has under right
to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property,
and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in
so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day;
and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to
drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate
an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of
life and business.
It is not a mere privilege, like the
moving of a house in the street, operating a business stand
in the street, which a city may permit or prohibit at will."
(Thompson v. Smith) 154 S.E. 579, 583
The Constitution did not give us our "common rights," they
merely helped preserve them and reinforced our immunities from an
arbitrary government or police power.
"He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither
swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their
substance." (Declaration of Independence) Organic Law.
Did we win that war?? -- Then we have those immunities!!
"We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction
in this particular between an individual and a corporation,
and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books
and papers for an examination at the suit of the State. The
individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a
citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in
his way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty
to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or
to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend
to criminate him.
He owes no duty to the State, since he
receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life
and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of
the land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and
can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in
accordance with the Constitution.
Among his rights are a
refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself
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and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant
of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does
not trespass upon their rights.
"Upon the other hand, the corporation is creature of the
State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of
the public.
It receives certain special privileges and
franchises and holds them subject to the laws of the State and
the limitations of its charter.
Its powers are limited by
law." (HALE v. HINKLE) 201 U.S. 43,74
The Salina case continues:
"The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public roadway
is not a fundamental right; it is a privilege that is granted
upon the compliance with statutory licensing procedures and
may be revoked."
The Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 Edition, used by Congress
defines the difference between a DRIVER and a TRAVELER.
(a) DRIVER: "One employed in conducting a coach, carriage,
wagon, or other vehicle with horses, mules, or other
animals."
(b) EMPLOYED:
"The act of doing a thing, and being under
contract or orders to do it."
(c) TRAVELER:

"One who passes from place to place, whether

for pleasure, instruction, business or health."
When the court is referring to a "Driver" who is hired as a
matter of contract to move freight for a profit on the public
right-of-way,

they

know

that

he

is

"driving

as

a matter

of

privilege and not as a matter of right."
There are over 80 cases by state Supreme Courts that state
that:

To travel is a common right.

To stop me when there is no

"crime," the government must have a civil right over me.

The

Organic Law states that law is established:
"for extending the fundamental principles of civil and
religious liberty, which form the basis whereon these
republics, their laws and constitutions are erected; to fix
and establish those principles as the basis of all laws
constitutions and governments, which forever hereafter shall
be formed in the said territory;"
(Section 13, Northwest
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Territorial Ordinance, Volume 1, U. S. Code.)
Sovereignty over government is with the people.

Sovereignty

over the corporations, their drivers and all regulated industry who
organize under the state statutes; is with the State.

It is a

creature created by the state.
"Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it
is the author and source of law; but in our system while
sovereign powers are delegated to agencies of government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for
whom all government exists and acts.
And the Law is the
definition and limitation of power." (of government) (Yick
Wo v. Hopkins)
"The sole object and only legitimate end of government is to
protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and
property; and when the government assumes other functions it
is usurpation and oppression."
(Alabama Constitution, Art.
I, Sec. 35)
Article VI, of The U. S. Constitution states:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding." (U.S. Const. Art. VI)
In Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, the U. S. Supreme Court said:
"No court in America ever yet thought, nor, I hope, ever will,
or acquiring jurisdiction by fiction...it is evident that we
are not to assume a voluntary jurisdiction, because we think,
or others might think, it may be exercised innocently, or even
wisely." (Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U. S. 308, 311, 312)
In Kemp v. Holt, the court ruled:
"The words life, liberty and property are constitutional terms
and are to be taken in the broadest sense. They indicate the
three great subdivisions of all civil rights.
The term
property in this clause embraces all valuable interests which
a man may possess outside of himself, and that is to say
outside of his life and liberty. It is not confined to mere
technical property, but literally to every species of vested
right." (Kemp v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620)
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To travel on the public right-of-ways is one of those common
or un-alien-able rights.

No government, constitution or law give

the citizens those rights; the citizen has always had them.
To save space, I refer the court to Marbury v. Madison (Cranch
1, 60) pages 69, 72, 73 and 74.
It is of utmost importance that my government obey the Organic
Law of the United States

"scrupulously,"

as stated by Justice

Brandeis in Olmstead v. U. S. and quoted in Miranda v. Arizona.
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STATE STATUTES
Utah Code 41-C-46 states that:
"(1) No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing."
The Utah Code then lists seven or eight conditions that must
be considered

when

a determination

prudent is being adjudicated.

of what

is reasonable

and

None of these conditions existed on

the road or at the scene in this case per the arresting officer.
There was no intersection, railroad crossing, curve, hill, crest,
narrow

or

conditions

winding

road,

that would

pedestrians,

cause

a

bad

traveler

to

weather
use

or

highway

extra-ordinary

caution.
The first question that must be raised is what is the enabling
act for this statute?
to the commerce

It can be found in the U. S. Code pertaining

and/or business titles not to citizens.

The

"person" can easily be construed to mean a creature, corporation
or regulated industry who uses the road for profit and gain.

See

Hale v. Hinkle under Jurisdiction.
The traffic regulations were established for two main reasons:
(1) to allow the traffic to flow better, faster and in higher
volumes, and (2) for the benefit of the insurance companies, whose
profits and losses are based on traffic accidents, and so the
courts and jury can fix the blame when there is a loss or injury.
The U. S. Supreme Court ruled:
"...The Constitution is the Supreme law of the land ordained
and established by the people. All legislation must conform
to the principles it lays down. When an act of Congress is
appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to
the constitutional mandate, the Judicial Branch of the
government has only one duty, to lay the Article of the
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Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the
former.
All the court does or can do is announce its
considered judgment upon the question*..Its delicate and
difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the
legislation is in accordance with or in contravention of the
provisions of the constitution; and having done that, its duty
ends." (U. S. v. Butler, 56 S.Ct. 312 [1936])
Our government has hoped to stabilize all common laws, rights,
immunities, acts and crimes so they can all be handled in a court
of Equity.

If it is not a crime, they figure out a way to make it

one, so it can be handled as an Equity.

When the state made or

hatched the creatures or corporations and gave them "privileges,"
it worked so well that they decided to include the citizens in it.
It has worked fairly well because most citizens have been brain
washed into believing that they travel on the public right-of-ways
as a matter of "privilege" not as a matter of "right."
Right-of-way or a Privilege-of-way?

Is it a

Most citizens are in such a

struggle to make a living and care for their families that they
have not had time to look up and see what is happening.

The

lawyers and the public servants are minding the store and just
about have it all under control.
Back to the Stature; If the speed limit is "reasonable and
prudent," the addition of a speed limit, such as 55 mph, is in
conflict with it.

There is no problem with the Appellant if the

state forces all those creatures who use the road for profit and
gain as a matter of privilege are restricted to the 55 mph speed
limit.
totally

The creatures exist for the benefit of the public and are
under

the

police

power

and

the

governmental

control.

Whereas the citizens become subject to the police power only when
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they commit a crime (a real crime), or cause harm, loss, injury to
someone or trespass upon another's right.
As everyone knows, the 55 mph was an edict by the President
of the United States, passed later by Congress, then forced upon
the States and the people by blackmail, duress and coercion.

This

law made "criminals" out of 99 percent of the people who entered
upon the highway.

This method of taxing and collecting revenues

cannot be constitutional because it is collected by the police
power in the courts.

There is, on the average, not one in one

hundred vehicles that stays below the 55 mph maximum speed limit
their whole trip.
clothes."

It is not dissimilar to the "king who had no

How long will it take for someone to wake up and say,

that is WRONG. Our children have grown up believing that there is
nothing wrong with breaking a law.,

After all everyone does, even

some judges.
BAKER has one report by the Utah DOT, Traffic Safety Engineer
that shows that the 55 mph did not save lives.
citations were issued.

In 1986, 160,000

Using $30 per citation equals $3,800,000,

only part of the out-of-pocket cost to the people and which is
perhaps four times that in time and effort.
the anguish caused by this ordeal.

This does not count

This situation could be looked

at as a method of controlling the "sheeple" and training them to
mind their masters, our public servants?

Some individuals think

they are goats, not sheep ready to be sheared.
The Appellant attempted to submit a number of State Supreme
Court cases as a defense and as jury instruction; they were all
denied, mostly because they were cases from other states, according
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to the prosecutor.
State v. Trimming is an Idaho case in which the defendant was
convicted in District Court of driving at a speed greater than was
reasonable

and

prudent.

Idaho

Supreme

Court

reversed

the

conviction and Justice Smith wrote the majority opinion:
" [5-7] I. C. Sec. 49-701 does not prohibit the driving in
excess of the limits specified. But if one does so drive,
then he must assume the burden of proving that in so driving
he was not unreasonable or imprudent under the conditions to
which the statute refers. And if his evidence shows that no
condition existed either actual, potential, or at all, which
would render his speed 'greater than is reasonable and
prudent,1 then the burden of proof, of overcoming the prima
facie presumption of unreasonable and imprudent driving, is
fully met.
There being no evidence of unreasonable or
imprudent driving 'under the conditions' then appellant was
entitled to acquittal of the charge of unreasonable and
imprudent driving, as a matter of law, the evidence being
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the court's
finding of unreasonable and imprudent driving 'under the facts
as set forth in said stipulation.'"
(Pages 121 and 122)
(underline mine)(State v. Trimming, 406 P. 2d 118)
In reversing a conviction, the Massachusetts Court, as quoted
in State v. Trimming, said:
"The real question in all these cases not is whether the speed
is greater than was reasonable and proper, having regard to
traffic and the use of the way and the safety of the public,
the burden being on the rState] to show that it was. If the
speed was such as to make out a prima facie case for the
prosecution, still the burden does not change. The jury are
to give due weight to the prima facie case taken in connection
with the other circumstances disclosed by the testimony * *
and if they are satisfied that the speed is greater than was
reasonable and proper, having regard to traffic and the use
of the way and the safety of the public, they should convict
the defendant; otherwise they should acguit him. And hence
in some cases a defendant may be convicted even if he has not
exceeded the rate named in the prima facie clauses of the
statute, and in some he may be acquitted even though he may
have exceeded it." (95 N.E. at 215-216, a 1911 case 209 Mass.
24, 95 N.E. 214)(State v. Trimming, 406 P. 2d, 118 [1965])
The Illinois Court, in reversing a judgment of conviction on
a charge of having violated the posted speed limit, said:
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"* * * Upon proof of driving at a speed in excess of the
posted speed limits a rebuttable presumption is raised that
the statute has been violated, and this presumption is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case on the part of the
State. The defendant may then introduce evidence to attack
the basic fact upon which the presumption is based, that the
defendant was driving at a speed in excess of the posted speed
limits, or the defendant by his evidence may show that the
conditions existing at the time and place of the arrest with
reference to traffic condition of the roadway, etc., were such
that he would be taken out of the purview of the statute. The
State throughout the case has the duty of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the defendant was driving at a speed in
violation of the specific statutory provisions, and unless the
State sustains that burden there should be a finding of not
guilty.
All that the presumption which is raised by a
violation of the posted speed limit does is to create a prima
facie case, and, standing alone and with no conflicting
evidence, it would be sufficient to support a judgment. This
presumption fails when the testimony of the State's witnesses
is inconsistent with the presumption and in its very essence
rebuts it,"
(This case is from People v. Perlman, 15
Ill.App.2d 239, 145 N.E. 2d 76f2 [1957], involved title 49 of
the Illinois Uniform Act Regulation Traffic, which contained
provisions, including the prima facie evidence rule, similar
to I.C. title 49-701 [and also Utah Code 41-6-46].)
The Ohio Court in reversing a judgment of conviction on a
charge laid under the statute, said:
•»* * * merely to operate (a motor vehicle) outside of a
municipality at a speed greater than 50 miles an hour is not
a violation of the law that being only prima facie and the
other provisions of the statute must be met as every person
is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt of all the essential elements of the crime
charged." State v. Hale 109 N.E.2d 590
State v. Wall 115 Ohio App. 323, 185 N.E.2d 115 (1962) the
Ohio Court stated in the headnote 185 N.E.2d at 125:
"* * * we conclude that the gist of the offense is whether the
speed in question is greater or less than is reasonable and
proper under the conditions specified in Section 4511.21,
supra, and that the particular speeds made prima facie lawful
or unlawful are just what they are called, prima facie
evidence to be considered along with the other evidence in the
case in determining the ultimate question whether the speed
is reasonable and proper."
In considering the evidence the Court stated:
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"* * * the great weight of the testimony is to the effect that
it was not raining and had not been for several hours; that
the road was dry; that it was wide and, there being no
evidence to the contrary, may be assumed to be satisfactorily
smooth; that there were no crossroads and in the entire three
miles only three roads which dead end into Highway 257; that
the speed traveled was between 55 and 60 miles an hour; that
the motor vehicle was nearly new and in good condition; for
which reason the judgment of conviction must be reversed upon
the weight of the evidence."
Olinvk v. People 642 P.2d 490 Colo (1981)
"The effect of
proof that a driver exceeded a prima facie speed limit is to
raise a rebuttable presumption that the driver's speed
exceeded
what
was
reasonable
or
prudent
under
the
circumstances. State v. Rich, 563 P.2d 918 (Ariz 1977). If,
however, the driver's speed is the only evidence submitted by
the prosecution, the defendant submits evidence sufficient to
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness, a court may rule
that defendant's speed, while in excess of the posted speed
limit, was legal under the circumstances existing at the time.
State v. Trimming, 89 Idaho 440, 406 P.2d 118 (1965)"
Horslev v. Robinson 168 P. 2d 592 (1947) A Utah case, Justice
Wade said, "What is a reasonable rate of speed under existing
conditions must always be determined very largely on how much
control the driver can maintain while driving at such rate."
168 P.2d at 596
Cardon v. Brenchlev 575 P. 2d 184 Decided in (1978).
"The
Plaintiff appealed the lower court's decision that there was
no cause for action. The defendant's vehicle was traveling
East on 900 South at 7500 West in Salt Lake City.
The
plaintiff's vehicle made a right hand turn onto 900 South and
headed East in the right hand lane. The plaintiff signaled
left and immediately turned into the left lane which is the
lane that the defendant was travelling.
The defendant was
travelling at a rate of speed of 70 miles per hour. When the
plaintiff turned onto 900 South the defendant started slowing
and, at the point that the defendant's vehicle collided with
the plaintiff's vehicle, the defendant was going at a rate of
speed of 60 mph.
"The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court in not awarding damages to plaintiff.
Phillip
Fishier was the attorney for the defendant. In writing the
majority opinion, Justice Crockett wrote:
"(1) it is true that our statutes provide that driving
in excess of certain stated speeds is prima facie evidence
that such speed is greater than that which is reasonable and
prudent under the circumstance; and it is also true that this
may constitute prima facie evidence of negligence. However,
that is not conclusive. The overriding principle governing
negligence is the exercise of the degree of care which an
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would exercise under
23

the circumstances."

(underlining mine)

The Utah Supreme Court found no negligence on the part of the
defendant even though there had been an accident and that the
defendant was travelling faster than the posted speed.
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RIGHTS MSUA SPONTI"
Please see my motion in the case file.
Circuit Court.

It was denied by the

If it is not in the case file, it will be furnished

to the court.

DEMAND FOR COUNSEL OF CHOICE
Please see my motion in the case file.
Circuit Court.

It was denied in

If it is not in the file, a copy will be furnished

to the court.
A man needs a "friend" or "counsel" to sit beside him during
the frightening and intimidating ordeal of a trial, to listen, take
notes, remind, calm the accused and be his friend.
should have the right to speak and help the Accused.

The friend
Even the 1st

Amendment allows people the right to free speech, assemble and
petition the government for a redress of grievances.

DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL -- NO RELIABLE WITNESS
Please see my motion in the case file.
Circuit Court.

It was denied in

If it is not in the file, a copy will be furnished

to the court.
The witnesses
trustworthy,

have proven that they were not "reliable,"

truthful, helpful

or

kind.

Their

integrity

and

veracity stinks and the courts are the only solution a citizen has
to do something about it.

That is my opinion at this time.

The

police know that their testimony weighs ten times more than the
citizen in the eyes of the court.

The citizen does not have much

of a chance to prove his innocence and, if he tries or challenges
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the police in court, the judge steps in on the side of the police.
The Court of Appeals may say that it is not always true, but it
happens too often. There were many war stories around; now I have
seen it for myself.

The Star Chamber Courts in action.

Article #38 of the Magna Carta states to the effect that:
M

No Officer, for the future, shall put any man to his law,
upon his own simple affirmation, without credible witness
produced for that purpose."
and Article #45:
"We will not make justiciaries, constables, sheriffs or
officers, excepting of such as know the laws of the land and
are well disposed to observe them."
The Magna Carta was adjudicated by the U. S. Supreme Court as
the origin of parts of the Constitution in Davidson v. New Orleans
(96 U.S. 97) and many other citations.
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JURY
BAKER submitted a brief in support on Notice and Demand for
Jury of 12.

Please review the motion in the case file.

Another

copy is available if it is not in the case file.
The Appellant believes that his rights and due process have
been denied him by not being allowed to voir dire the prospective
jurors, especially in this case.
The Judge refused to ask some of BAKER'S questions, he changed
others and, several times, denied follow-up on some of the answers
given

which

individual.

was

necessary

to

determine

the

attitude

of

the

The Judge acted like BAKER was a villain from whom he

was protecting the jury.

The Judge's attitude of disgust toward

the Appellant brought out prejudiced feelings in the jury members.
One question asked for BAKER showed prejudice in nine out of
the eleven

prospective

jurors.

Nine

held

up

objecting to BAKER taking this case to court.

their

hands

as

BAKER challenged

them for cause, but the Judge refused to remove any of them.
demanded that they be polled to determine their attitude.

BAKER
The

Judge refused, at first, then relented and asked each of them if
they would please admit that BAKER had a right to have his case
heard in court.

Several still objected, but the "good" Judge

coaxed them into submission.

One man argued with the Judge for

several minutes and BAKER insisted that he be removed for cause.
The "good" Judge, in all of his wisdom, decided that none of the
people would be challenged for cause.
If a juror is not convinced that the Accused is innocent at
the first of the trial, it may take somewhat less than "proof
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beyond and reasonable doubt" to sway him to the verdict of guilty.
Let it be known that this group of jurors were fairly well
convinced by the Judge that BAKER was guilty at the outset.

They

were willing to let BAKER have his day in court as a favor to the
Judge.
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FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The Fourth Amendment rights of the Appellant were violated
when he was stopped by the police officer.

The charge of speeding

was false and there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that the
Appellant was involved in a crime.
"Held:
The application of the Texas Statute to detain
appellant and require him to identify himself violated the
Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable
suspicion to believe that appellant was engaged or had engaged
in criminal conduct, detained appellant to require him to
identify himself constituted a seizure of his person subject
to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment that the seizure
be 'reasonable. ' ff
(cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1; U. S. v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873; BROWN v. TEXAS, 443 US 47.
"All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and
void."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1 cranch) 137, 175.
Recommended reading 162-178.
The police officers took an oath to uphold and support the
Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Utah.

The

purpose of those constitutions was to set up a form of government
that would protect the rights and immunities the people already
had.

The unalienable rights are property just as much as a parcel

of land, a house or a car.

To uphold and protect the Constitutions

is to protect and uphold the common law and unalienable rights of
each and every citizen.

It is not to act as a collector of

revenues for the government.
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there
can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 438, 491.
"The people themselves have in their power effectively to
resist usurpation, without being driven to an appeal in arms.
An act of usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; and any
man is justified in his resistance.* * *" 2 Elliot's Debates.
94; 2 Bancroft, History of the Constitution, 267.
"Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that
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are commands to the Citizens.
In a government of laws,
existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher.
For good or ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means.. .would bring
terrible retribution. Against the pernicious doctrine this
Court should resolutely set its face."
Olmstead v. U.S.
(dicta); Miranda v. Arizona, 277 U.S. 438, 485; 48 S.Ct. 564,
575.
The ACCUSED firmly believes that those public servants who
have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution and obey the law of
the land should know the "law of the land" and obey it to the
letter of that law.
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Since the outset of this case, many of the Appellant's rights,
identified in the Utah State Constitution Article I, have been
violated.
Section 1.

His inherent and inalienable rights have been

totally ignored by the police officer, prosecutor and the Courts.
Defence of

liberties

and property, protest

against wrings and

petition for redress of grievances have been impaired to the point
that it is almost impossible to do so. Very likely, a citizen will
end up in jail.
Section 2.

Appellant has not had equal protection under the

law, the Organic Law.
Section

3.

That is the Law of the Land, is it not?

The

Appellant's

rights

under

the

U.

S.

Do the courts recognize "due process of law"?

It

Constitution have been denied.
Section 7.

was denied at almost every point in the trial and hearings.

From

jury selection, evidence placed before the court, false charges,
denial

of

discovery,

lack

of

substantial

evidence

against

Appellant, false testimony on part of police, denial of motions for
rights and threatened jail sentence were all violations of due
process.
Section 9.

Excessive bail was threatened.

If Judge had not

relented, there would have been no trial.
Section 10. This, being a criminal case between the State and
a citizen, a jury of twelve is required.
Section 11.

If these courts are open, the Appellant does not
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know what open means.

The courts actually punish, intimidate and

coerce the people who try to defend their rights and property.

The

wrath of

the

the court was upon the Appellant

from the time

Appellant stated that he was a "free citizen."
Section 12.
Appellant.

There were no reliable witnesses against the

They have been shown to lie without compunction.

Section 14.

Are people secure when a "law" is passed making

99 percent of them guilty of a crime every time they enter upon the
public right-of-way of the Interstate System.

The Interstate was

designed for 70 mph and the engineering studies show that 70 mph
was a safe speed?
Section 15.

The jury shall have the right to determine the

law and the fact?

The court denied this and stopped the Appellant

from saying anything about it.

Is that denial of due process and

this provision or is it "just the way it is"?
Section 18. No Bill of Attainder?

The high courts ruled that

for non-capital crimes, it was called Bill of Pains and Penalties.
The Appellant still has many emotional bruises from his experience.
Section 21. To stop the Appellant without cause, deny him the
use of his vehicle, deny him the right-of-way for carrying on his
personal business and claim civil and criminal authority over him,
is the "essence of slavery itself."
Section 24.
operation.

(Yick Wo)

The laws and the courts do not have uniform

If a man claims his rights in the courts, he will get

the full bias and prejudice of the court.
Section 25. The people have rights?
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Tell it to the judge and

see where you get.
Section 27.
is

essential

to

You get the full wrath of the court upon you.
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles
the

security

perpetuity of free government."

of

individual

rights

and

the

Why is the Appellant the only one

who believes that???
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Appellant was never travelling at any speed greater than
62 or 63 mph, the cruise control was set at 62 mph and the
speedometer has a full half circle diameter and easily read.
In today's traffic the Appellant would be the slowest car on
this stretch of 1-15.
The Officer could not have clocked the Appellant for many
reasons.
A.

The Appellant did not go that fast.

B.

The Officer's speed was 30 mph to 40 mph faster than the
Appellant when the vehicles were within 400 feet of each
other.

C.

The Officer lied when he said that he could clock a car
to within one mph or even 5 mph from 250 feet behind, in
another lanef on a very dark night and the car going
directly away from him with no stationary objects to
relate to and read his RADAR; all within two seconds.
One mph would be 1.5 feet every second.

Three feet

difference would be 1.2 percent of 250 feet for the two
seconds.
D.

The Officer lied when he said he did all of this from the
middle lane which was stacked with cars no more than 50
feet apart. He would have rear-ended at least three cars
in his lane.

E.

Officer Michaud supported Busch's testimony, admitted
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that the traffic was heavy, yet we know that he could not
have seen the Appellant's vehicle from the passenger side
of the vehicle, if there was another car less than 50
feet in front of him.
There

was

no

crime,

intent,

damage,

loss,

trespass

of

another's rights, no one was endangered.
The 55 mph speed limit on Interstate Highways was and is
unconstitutional.

It violates the rights of the reasonable

and prudent citizens and violates the Utah Code 41-6-47, 48
whereby the posted speed is to be determined by an engineering
investigation.

The posted speed should be established as the

85 percentile of the speed traveled by the highway users.
The harassment of the people, the cost of their time,
anguish, delays and costs for setting the dispute have cost
them many tens of millions of dollars annually.
The difference between 55 mph and 65 mph is 18 percent
and the difference between 55 mph and 70 mph is 27 percent.
This loss in efficiency, according to many economists, was a
major contributor to the United States' economic slump and not
being

competitive

in

the

world

market.

Thanks

to

our

government and our courts.
The Appellant acts as a matter of right according to the
doctrine enumerated by Hale v. Hinkle, Thompson v. Smith and
Yick Wo v. Hopkins.

The creatures created by the State act

as a matter of privilege and are totally subject to the whims
of the State, legislatures
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and police power; civilly and

criminally.
6.

The court and the prosecutor demonstrated no interest in the
fact

of

the

case

appearances, their

or

that

justice

be

served.

To

all

interest was to teach the Appellant a

lesson and get him back into the flock or into jail, and they
did not seem to care which.
7.

Due process was denied the Appellant at almost every point
from the stop to the Sentence Hearing.

8.

The Appellant's rights "Sua Sponti," demand for Counsel of
Choice, right to a reliable witness and case law supporting
his position were all denied by the courts.

9.

The Judge's handling of the void dire of the prospective
jurors was a violation of every principle of fairness and
decency, notwithstanding due process.

10.

The list of violations of the Appellant's rights as set forth
in the provisions of the Utah State Constitution include more
than half of the 27 sections of Article I.

11.

Many other state supreme courts have ruled that prima facie
evidence that a driver exceeded the posted speed limit is not
proof that he drove unreasonably or imprudently.

Speed alone

is not proof that he drove unreasonably or imprudently.
It appears to the Appellant, that his government has, or think
they have, reduced the citizens of this country to the rank of
surfs, peons and servants and that they must be subservient to
their masters, the government.
Our public servants are ordering us around as if we were a
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herd of sheep.

They enter our legislature and tell how much we

will pay them in taxes.
Our lawyers, officers of the court, have also entered our
legislatures en masse to determine our laws and statutize our every
move and make laws to punish us if we question them or their
actions.
Apparently, we, the citizens, have slept too long.

It is now

up to our courts to give us back our unalienable rights and
immunities we once had.
Submitted this 21 day of October, 1988.
Respectf ull^xours,

CO
,. D. Baker
In Propria Persona
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